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Fund Families as Delegated Monitors of Money Managers
Abstract
Because a money manager learns more about her skill from her management experience than
outsiders can learn from her realized returns, she expects inefficiency in future contracts that
condition exclusively on realized returns. A fund family that learns what the manager learns can
reduce this inefficiency cost if the family is large enough. The family’s incentive is to retain any
given manager regardless of her skill but, when the family has enough managers, it adds value by
boosting the credibility of its retentions through the firing of others. As the number of managers
grows the efficiency loss goes to zero.
1 Introduction
Open-end mutual funds intermediate much of the investment in financial securities. A number of
papers have examined the potential moral hazard and information asymmetry problems that can
arise between the investors and the portfolio managers of these funds (just managers, from here
on).1 However, a manager does not usually work directly for investors, but rather for a mutual-fund
family like Fidelity. The existence of this additional layer of agency is a significant complication
whose economic role, other than possibly economies of scale and scope, has to date been somewhat
of a puzzle.
We provide a resolution that develops the intuition that investors learn less about manager
quality than managers can learn themselves. In such a setting, we argue, the fund family can act as
a validation mechanism for the manager by conveying to investors the manager’s own information
about her skill, which she could not otherwise convey. But just as all managers have an incentive
to say that they are skilled, fund families have an incentive to say that all the managers they hire
are skilled. So why would investors believe fund families any more than managers? We show how
mutual fund families can credibly convey manager quality with a commitment to fire a return-
dependent fraction of managers. Investors know that when it comes time to bite the bullet, the
fund family will fire the worst managers first. The remaining managers are thus of better expected
quality, and an investor can use this information to make a better-informed decision about whether
to invest in a fund or not. The family does not completely solve the problem since the fraction to
be fired is determined ex ante and can differ from the ex post fraction that is unskilled. But as the
number of funds monitored by the family grows, the per-manager likelihood of a difference goes to
zero and, in the limit, managers are fired if and only if they are unskilled, as a first-best scenario
would dictate.
Our analysis centers around a two-period model of the money-management problem with risk-
neutral investors, managers and monitors. We assume that the economic surplus created by money
management is all captured by managers and fund families while investors only earn normal returns.
While in principle this surplus could be shared with investors, our assumption can be justified by
the work of Berk and Green (2002). In their model, the scarcity of investment skill causes capital to
flow to investment opportunities until they are completely dissipated, which allows the manager to
capture all the surplus. We also assume that everybody has the same information about manager
1Important papers include Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985), Starks (1987), Kihlstrom (1988), Huberman and
Kandel (1993), Heinkel and Stoughton (1994), Admati and Pfleiderer (1997), Huddart (1999), and Das and Sun-
daram (2002).
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quality at the outset but that managers, through their trading experience, learn their skills faster
and more precisely than investors do. The latter part of this assumption is key. We think it is
reasonable as managers know about many dimensions of their trading strategies that investors can
only imperfectly infer. For example, managers know why they take their positions, they know the
positions they choose not to take, and they know the precise timing and size of each of their trades.
In the same spirit, at the end of the model’s first period, investors update based on the fund’s
first-period return, while the manager learns whether she is skilled or not.
In the absence of monitoring, an adverse selection problem emerges since a manager who gen-
erates a high return by luck, rather than skill, has no incentive to reveal this to investors. Instead,
she pools with the skilled managers, who have no credible way of signalling their skills, and she
is consequently rehired by investors.2 Similarly, a manager who experiences a low return because
of bad luck, not bad skill, cannot credibly signal this information to investors and is stuck in the
pool of low-return managers who are not rehired. In both cases, the under-informed investors make
hiring decisions that fail to capture all the available surplus.
In this context, enabling investors to learn a manager’s skill at the same pace as the manager
herself increases the economic surplus that the manager’s activities are expected to generate ex ante.
In the first-best scenario, the investors have the same information as the manager, and so can avoid
hiring an unskilled manager or letting a skilled manager go. Because managers retain any surplus,
they stand to gain from investors learning their skills at a faster pace, and so would like to commit
ex ante to revealing their information to investors as they learn it. Their problem is to do so
credibly, without revealing important private information about their trading strategies.
Our paper’s main contribution is to show that managers can solve this credibility problem by
joining fund families, who act as delegated monitors of money managers. Families learn what their
managers learn, namely their skills.3 In other words, we assume that the manager’s information
can be communicated to or observed by the family they join. Clearly, the bulk of this information
cannot be shared with individual investors, as it would lead to front-running. Instead, it is much
safer and economical for the manager to disclose this sensitive information to closely-watched board
members affiliated with a fund family. The credibility of families is not immediate, however, because
their incentives regarding negative information resemble those of their managers; they too gain from
investors believing the best of the managers. However, the credibility problem is alleviated when
the fund family has multiple fund managers under its umbrella. For example, suppose that two
2Limited liability enables us to rule out negative compensation, which would permit some signalling to take place.
3It is only critical that families learn more than investors do.
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managers perform badly in a given period. When these managers operate outside of a fund family,
they can no longer manage money: investors infer from their returns that further investment is not
worthwhile, even if it is possible that bad luck was responsible for the bad performance. When these
managers operate within a fund family, the family can choose to fire one of these two managers. This
firing is relatively cheap since investors would not have invested with the fired manager anyhow.
At the same time, the firing provides useful information to investors about the retained manager:
when retaining a manager, the family prefers keeping one who is skilled (and was unlucky) than one
who is unskilled, as it can expect this manager to generate more money in the future. So, although
investors do not observe the skills of a retained manager, they know that she is likely more skilled
than the fired manager. In other words, when managers can be fired by a fund family, investors
can update about manager skills not only through their past performance but also through the
retention decisions of the family they belong to. This can make the hiring of a skilled but unlucky
manager possible, reducing the amount of economic surplus lost to adverse selection.
The paper goes on to show that the monitoring implicitly performed by a fund family through
its firing and retention decisions improves as more funds join the family. This is because both
type-1 (keeping an unskilled manager) and type-2 (firing a skilled manager) errors can be smaller
when more managers are compared to each other. In the limit, as the number of funds grows,
a commitment by the family to fire the expected fraction of unskilled managers, conditional on
the first-period return, results in exactly the unskilled managers being fired. As a result, the full
first-best surplus is recaptured, though managers must share this gain with the family.
Except for this limiting result, the monitoring mechanism that we characterize is imperfect. This
is not surprising given Diamond’s (1984) insight that the delegation of monitoring to a self-interested
third-party brings agency problems of its own. Diamond (1984) and Krasa and Villamil (1992)
show that the pooling of monitored agents can improve the efficiency of delegated monitoring. Our
paper points out that applying a similar mechanism to the money management industry yields an
interesting result: money managers pooled into fund families can be monitored more credibly and
efficiently, and thus can manage money more profitably.
This mechanism is reminiscent of the one at work in the models of internal capital markets
developed by Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) and by Stein (1997). In these models, a corpo-
ration’s headquarters gets to pick the relative winners and losers in the competition by the firm’s
divisions for fixed resources. This better ex post allocation of resources makes ex ante financing
cheaper and more efficient. The fund family performs a similar function in our model, not so much
by allocating resources, but by picking which managers get to remain under its umbrella. As a mon-
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itor of money managers, our fund family is similar to the monitor of Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
who participates in the profits of the team (the set of funds), can observe what each team member
(manager) observes, and can alter the membership of the team (i.e., fire managers). However,
the presence of the monitor in our model is the result of a completely different force. In Alchian
and Demsetz (1972), because the output of each team member cannot be individually observed,
organizing into a team creates a free-rider problem that monitoring is designed to reduce. Effort is
costless in our model so there is no free-rider problem; instead, the creation of a team of funds is
what makes monitoring possible.
The process by which managers get to stay employed is similar to the way workers get promoted
in the literature on tournaments.4 For example, whereas a fixed pre-specified fraction of workers get
promoted in Malcomson’s (1984) model of a firm, a fixed pre-specified fraction of money managers
remain employed in our model of a fund family. The important difference between the two models
lies in their purpose: tournaments within firms are designed to motivate workers to exert effort
while the implicit ability tournaments that take place within fund families make allocations of
capital to their funds by investors more efficient.5 Indeed, the firing of some fraction of a fund
family’s managers can boost the expected ability of those remaining, as perceived by investors who
ultimately choose whether or not to have their money managed.
Several authors have analyzed delegated portfolio management problems in which investors seek
to learn about a manager’s skills over time. In Huberman and Kandel (1993) and Huddart (1999),
risk-averse managers know their skill ex ante, and choose their portfolios knowing that investors will
infer skill from their portfolios’ returns. Both studies find pooling and separating equilibria, where
the separating equilibria involve skilled managers investing in the one risky asset more aggressively,
so that, win or lose, they are identifiable ex post as the skilled ones. Heinkel and Stoughton (1994)
and Farnsworth (2001) also address the situation where a manager knows her ability and investors
try to infer it, but add moral hazard as a problem that the compensation contract must resolve.
The use of a benchmark return proves to be an integral part of the resulting contract. Similarly,
Holmstro¨m (1999) analyzes a multi-period contracting problem between a principal and an agent,
at the beginning of which neither knows the agent’s ability. The paper concentrates on the agent’s
effort patterns throughout her relationship with the agent. In all these models, the manager is able
4See Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1981), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Malcomson (1984, 1986),
Rosen (1986), and Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988). We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out
this analogy.
5We do not deny the possibility that the threat of getting fired could also affect the effort level of a family’s money
managers. However, by assuming away moral hazard problems, our model emphasizes the allocation value of ability
tournaments.
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to affect what investors learn about her through the (portfolio and/or effort) choices she makes in
the early periods. Although these effects could be incorporated into our model, we rule them out in
order to isolate the informational role played by fund families in the money management industry.
The learning aspect of our model is similar to that of Lynch and Musto (2003), which is not about
monitoring but about fund flows. Their model assumes that both managers and investors learn
only from past returns, while our model allows managers to learn more than investors.
Although Sharpe (1981) and Barry and Starks (1984) do not discuss the potential monitoring
benefits of pooling managers under one monitoring entity, they do discuss the advantages for
investors of contracting with multiple managers simultaneously. In particular, Sharpe (1981) argues
that investing with more than one money manager achieves skills diversification, that is, it makes
the ex post value of fund managing more predictable, a benefit to risk-averse investors. Barry
and Starks (1984) show that risk sharing can improve when an investor contracts with more than
one risk-averse money manager at a time. A recent paper by Pichler (2002) shows how these two
benefits can complement each other within a team of money managers.
To our knowledge, the economics of the fund family as an organization have not been treated
theoretically. Empirical work is also relatively sparse. Khorana and Servaes (1999) look at fund
family decisions to open new funds. Massa (2003) shows that the organization of funds into families
creates positive externalities across these funds which in turn affect their performance and fees.
Finally, Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2003) study the strategic behavior of families to attract flows
to their funds.6 As far as we know, the monitoring role of fund families remains untested, but our
model yields several testable implications that should provide guidance for future empirical work.
Furthermore, our theory’s predictions distinguish it from the stories of economies of scale and scope
that the aforementioned papers are ultimately based on.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we define and motivate the two-
period model. In section 3, we show the efficiency loss incurred in the absence of monitoring. In
section 4, we allow the manager to work in a fund family and discuss the agency problem that
prevents effective monitoring by a one-fund family. We then show when and how a two-fund family
can recover value, and generalize the result to N funds. Section 5 contains a discussion of the model
and its predictions. Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A.
6Some empirical work addresses a question related to the organization of funds into families, namely the role
of fund managers’ employers and boards. For example, Khorana (1996) documents the relation between return
and continued employment, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show demotion and separation following poor return, and
promotion following high return, and Tufano and Sevick (1997) study the effect of board composition on the fees
charged by mutual funds.
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2 The Model
There are two periods (t = 1, 2). At the start of each period, a different group of A small risk-
neutral investors, each with a dollar, make their investment decision: they can invest in the market
directly, or they can pool their money into a mutual fund managed by a risk-neutral manager. In
both periods, direct investments in financial markets yield an unconditional return which is either
x ∈ (0, 1] or −x with equal probabilities. So uninformed investments have a zero expected return.7
If instead investors choose to invest in the mutual fund for a period, the fund manager generates
signals which are potentially informative about the returns of traded financial assets in that period.8
Skilled managers generate excess expected returns. More precisely, a manager with skill α ∈ (0, 1)
improves the probability that returns are positive from 12 to
1+α
2 , and so generates an average
return of 1+α2 x +
1−α
2 (−x) = xα > 0. Unskilled managers, on the other hand, cannot improve on
the unconditional return distribution; their expected returns are zero. Managers are skilled with
probability φ, and the random variable
a˜ =
{
α, prob. φ
0, prob. 1 − φ (1)
denotes a manager’s skill, which is initially unknown.9 In each period t, therefore, the return that
a manager generates on behalf of the fund’s investors is given by
r˜t =

 +x, prob.
1+a˜
2
−x, prob. 1−a˜2 .
(2)
The cost of operating the fund is k > 0, which is absorbed equally by each of the investors.10 This
cost represents expenses incurred by the fund for transacting, hiring personnel, buying computer
equipment, and so on. We assume that k is large relative to each investor’s investible funds, so that
it is prohibitively expensive for an individual investor to form his own fund. The net profit that a
manager with A dollars under management generates in period t is Ar˜t − k. Thus a manager with
7Risk neutrality eliminates the need to incorporate the effect of risk on behavior and returns. Alternatively, we
can think of the model’s returns as excess returns after properly accounting for risk.
8We assume the signals are free, i.e., there is no private effort cost, so as to avoid conflating the dynamics of
interest here with moral hazards. A previous version of this paper (available upon request) had a private effort cost
and results were similar.
9Avery and Chevalier (1999) also study a model in which the manager initially does not know her own ability.
Their analysis, which does not consider the agency aspect of the manager’s position, concentrates on the herding
behavior of the manager over time.
10We could have incorporated the operating cost of the fund into the returns by subtracting k from both +x and
−x. This would not affect any of our results. In fact, this would be equivalent to assuming that k is proportional
to A.
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a probability p of being skilled is expected to generate a net profit of Axαp − k. We also refer to
this quantity as the expected net value or expected surplus of the fund.
At the beginning of the first period, neither the manager nor the investors know whether the
manager is skilled. They all use the same prior probability of φ that the manager is skilled, and
all calculate the expected net value she creates to be Axαφ − k. Information symmetry at the
the start rules out equilibria in which managers have favorable or unfavorable private information
about their skill, and the ones with favorable information somehow distinguish themselves. Such a
separating equilibrium would complicate the analysis but not distort our verification mechanism,
so long as managerial skill cannot be determined with certainty. In other words, it is only critical
for our analysis that in equilibrium, there is some uncertainty about managerial skill for experience
to resolve.
At the beginning of the second period, investors update their beliefs about the manager using
the public information available at that time, namely the information contained in first-period
returns. At the same time, the manager updates her beliefs with what she has privately learned
about herself in the first period. This information allows her to update more accurately than
investors, as she knows not only her return but also the portfolio that generated it, why she bought
that portfolio, how the realized returns of different assets compare to her ex ante expectations, and
so on. For simplicity, we assume that the manager’s private information allows her to learn her
skill perfectly after the first period.
Each period starts with the manager announcing a compensation contract that she is willing
to work for, and the period’s investors accepting or rejecting the offer. This setup mirrors the
mutual fund industry in that funds publicly announce their fees and investors are free to choose
whether they want to invest. We make three assumptions about contracting. First, compensation
is allowed to depend only on the realized return of the fund. Given that returns can take only
two possible values in each period, this contract is fully characterized by the wage that will be
paid by the investors to the manager in each of the two states. Second, there is no negative
compensation: instead of paying, the manager would just file bankruptcy.11 Third, we adopt
Berk and Green’s (2002) result that the marginal dollar invested in a mutual fund generates no
excess return in equilibrium. In our setting, this means that the contract leaves investors with zero
expected surplus. This assumption is not essential; it just simplifies the model. Our fund-family
mechanism of later sections works whenever managers gain in expectation from investors learning
11For more information on principal-agent contracting in the presence of limited liability, see Innes (1990) and
Rajan and Srivastava (2003).
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manager skill at a faster pace, and this occurs whenever the manager’s expected remuneration is
increasing in the ex ante surplus.
Because investors and the manager agree at the time of first-period contracting that the prob-
ability of a high first-period return is 1+αφ2 , they all calculate the same expected wage for a given
contract, and therefore any contract with expectation Axαφ − k under these probabilities serves
equally well.12 Without negative compensation, the manager cannot be hired in the first place if
this quantity is negative, so we assume that the parameters satisfy the restriction
φ ≥ k
Axα
. (3)
Because the manager has private information after the first period about the probability of a high
second-period return (it is 1+α2 if the manager learned she is skilled and
1
2 otherwise), there is a
signaling problem with second-period contracts. Among the contracts under which investors expect
zero surplus, skilled managers prefer the contract with the lowest payment for low returns. The
equilibrium contract pays the minimum for low returns, which under our assumptions is zero. Thus,
the second-period contract the manager offers takes the form13
w˜2 =
{
ω, if r˜2 = +x
0, if r˜2 = −x.
(4)
Since ω is the contract’s only moving part, we sometimes refer to the second-period contract simply
as ω. Under the assumption that investors get zero expected surplus, the ω offered by the manager
is the one at which investors calculate an expected net return of zero and the manager’s expected
compensation exactly equals the expected surplus.
Finally, the manager is assumed to receive nothing if she is not managing money, i.e., her
reservation wage is assumed to be zero. As a result, even an unskilled manager prefers a chance
at receiving this fee to not managing money, and so a manager who discovers she is unskilled has
no incentive to reveal this information to investors. While it is important that skilled managers
are unable to reveal this information to investors, we could get the same result by assuming that
liability is limited to a number other than zero, and that the reservation wage is a number other
than zero. We set both values to zero to have as simple a model as possible.
12More precisely, any contract that pays the manager ω+x (ω−x) after high (low) returns and satisfies
1 + αφ
2
ω+x +
1 − αφ
2
ω−x = Axαφ − k
will be agreeable.
13A formal proof that this contract is signaling-proof is provided in Appendix B. It is also worth mentioning
that, in a model where skill gets impounded into performance only through costly effort, the contract that pays the
manager only after positive returns would also provide the strongest incentives.
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Figure 1
Sequence of events in each period
In each period, the manager offers a contract to the investors, who can accept or reject it. If the investors
accept, the manager invests their money; otherwise, they make their own investments. Payoffs are realized
at the end of the period.
3 Equilibrium in the Absence of Monitoring
3.1 Strategies and Equilibrium
The chronology of this economy in each period is illustrated in Figure 1. Each period t begins with
the manager offering investors to manage their money for one period in return for a compensation
contract w˜t. The investors are free to decide whether or not to hire the money manager. If hired,
the manager collects information and invests the investors’ money. The first period ends with
investors and manager receiving their first-period payoffs and the manager observing her ability.
The second period repeats the process, except that second-period investors can use first-period
returns to update their beliefs about the manager’s ability. The economy ends after the second-
period payoffs.
The manager makes one decision per period, which is the compensation contract she offers, and
the investors’ one decision in each period is to accept or reject. Since the manager and investors
are symmetrically informed at the outset, first-period contracting is straightforward: as mentioned
above, the equilibrium contract has an expected value of Axαφ − k, regardless of its form, and
the investors accept it. From here on we focus exclusively on the second period, and accordingly
drop the time subscript so as to minimize notation. The second-period contract has an important
dependence on investors’ beliefs about the manager.
Lemma 3.1 Suppose that, at the beginning of the second period, investors assign a probability p
that the manager is skilled. The manager is then hired by the investors if and only if
p ≥ k
Axα
. (5)
9
The manager’s compensation in that period is then
ω = ω(p) ≡ 2(Axαp − k)
1 + αp
. (6)
The second-period investors expect the manager to generate a surplus of Axαp − k on average,
so condition (5) simply states that the manager will be hired when this expectation is non-negative.
This happens when the investors’ beliefs about the manager’s skill, p, are large enough. The same
condition can also be written as xαp ≥ kA , leading to an alternative interpretation: investors pool
their money into the managed fund when the fund’s expected return exceeds the fund’s per-dollar
fees. When that is the case, the manager extracts all surplus by charging ω(p) for a positive return.
Note that ω(p) is increasing in p, so that both the probability of, and compensation for, a high
return increase as the manager’s apparent skill grows.
What is the manager’s apparent skill? Investors start with prior belief φ and then update with
the manager’s realized return via Bayes’ rule.
Lemma 3.2 After first-period fund returns of +x, investors assign a probability of
φ+x ≡ (1 + α)φ1 + αφ (7)
to the manager being skilled. After first-period fund returns of −x, investors assign a probability of
φ−x ≡ (1 − α)φ1 − αφ (8)
to the manager being skilled.
The connection between skill and returns delivers φ+x > φ > φ−x. Since φ is already assumed
high enough for the manager to be hired, this immediately implies that the manager is retained
after good performance, and that her expected compensation conditional on good performance (but
not on whether she is skilled) is her expected surplus Axαφ+x − k. On the other hand, φ−x could
be either less or greater than kAxα . From Lemma 3.1, we know that the manager is retained only if
it is greater, with an expected compensation conditional on poor performance of Axαφ−x − k. The
next section calculates the second-period compensation the manager expects at the outset, before
anything is learned about her ability, by combining these quantities.
3.2 Manager Surplus and First-Best
The manager’s expected second-period compensation at the outset, which we denote π0, is the
probability of good performance times the expected compensation conditional on good performance,
10
plus the probability of bad performance times the expected compensation, if any, conditional on
bad performance. Alternatively, because the manager extracts all rents, her expected second-period
compensation is simply the expected surplus that her activities generate.
Before we perform this calculation, it is useful to describe the first-best scenario for this model.
In that scenario, investors learn about managerial skills at the same pace as the manager. This
means that second-period investors know a˜, and so no longer require first-period returns, when they
make their contracting decisions. Clearly, with this information, investors would hire the manager
only when she is skilled. The ex ante probability of this happening is φ, and the expected net
surplus generated by a skilled manager is Axα − k. Thus, in this first-best scenario, the expected
second-period compensation of the manager is φ(Axα − k).
As the following proposition shows, when the manager learns her ability faster than investors
do, the second-period compensation that she can expect at the outset is smaller than φ(Axα − k).
This is because the hiring decisions of investors are no longer perfectly informed. In particular,
retaining an unskilled manager and letting a skilled manager go both destroy value, and value
destruction reduces the surplus than can be captured by the manager ex ante.
Proposition 3.1 If φ−x < kAxα , then
π0 = φ(Axα − k) − 1 − α2 φ(Axα − k) −
1
2
(1 − φ)k. (9)
If φ−x ≥ kAxα , then
π0 = φ(Axα − k) − (1 − φ)k. (10)
To better understand the two sources of value destruction (and their associated negative terms
in (9) and (10)), we turn to Table 1, which decomposes the manager’s expected compensation in
the second period. Because first-period returns (r˜1) and skill (a˜) can each take two possible values,
there are four possible first-period outcome combinations. For each of these outcomes, the table
shows the hiring decisions made by the second-period investors, depending on whether they learn
at the same pace as the manager (first-best) or not (asymmetric learning).
When φ−x < kAxα and investors do not learn a˜, they hire the manager only if r˜1 = +x since the
manager is not worth hiring after a bad performance. When they do learn a˜, the same investors
ignore r˜1, and instead hire the manager only if a˜ = α. Since the average net surpluses that skilled
and unskilled managers generate are Axα− k > 0 and −k respectively, it is clear that inefficiencies
occur when an unskilled manager is hired (r˜1 = +x, a˜ = 0) or a skilled manager is not retained
(r˜1 = −x, a˜ = α). The table also reports the surplus lost to these contracting inefficiencies. When
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multiplied by the probability of their corresponding first-period outcome, these inefficiencies yield
the two negative terms in (9).
A similar argument can be made to obtain the negative term in (10). When φ−x ≥ kAxα ,
the manager is hired by the second-period investors regardless of her first-period performance.
Inefficiencies then occur when an unskilled manager is hired, that is, in the (r˜1 = +x, a˜ = 0) and
(r˜1 = −x, a˜ = 0) outcomes. These two outcomes have a combined probability of occurrence of
1−φ, and the surplus lost to the hiring of an unskilled manager is k, as the last column of Table 1
shows. Multiplying these two terms together yields the negative term in (10).
The analysis in this section shows how the manager loses from inefficient contracting. In the
remainder of the paper, we show how delegated monitoring can eliminate at least some of this
inefficiency and so provide a valuable service to the manager.
4 Delegated Monitoring
A manager’s alternative to managing without a monitor is to join a fund family. A fund family can
in principle bring several benefits, such as economizing on marketing and investor relations; the
one we focus on here is the fund family’s potential to monitor. We expand the model to multiple
managers, and we allow them to join a stylized fund family: in return for receiving a fraction of
the manager’s wage, the fund family intermediates her initial contract with the public, learns her
skill along with her, and then either retains or fires her. If the family retains exactly the skilled
managers, this arrangement recovers exactly the first-best surplus (gross of the family’s share). But
it is unlikely that the family can be induced to fire exactly the unskilled managers. What is more
interesting and meaningful is whether the family adds value in the context of realistic incentives
for the family to retain or fire. In this section, we introduce the concept of a fund family, discuss
the incentive problem that it faces, and then resolve the problem. The key to the resolution is to
allow a family to monitor multiple funds.
4.1 Fund Family Defined
The manager can join a fund family at the outset. To join, the manager negotiates a fraction µ
of her second-period wages, if any, that will go to the family. The fixed fraction means that the
family has limited liability since the manager has limited liability. We also assume that the family
is risk-neutral just like the manager. The family offers contracts to investors. As before we assume
that investors pay all expected surplus, so the first-period expected wage is again Axαφ − k. The
family has access to the same information as the manager and so learns her skill over the first
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period, and then retains or fires her. There is no moral hazard with the monitor; once engaged,
the monitor learns what the managers learn. To eliminate moral hazard, it is enough that the
monitor’s action of monitoring is observable. For simplicity, we further assume that monitoring is
costless and the family’s opportunity cost of monitoring is zero.14 Second-period investors also pay
all expected surplus so, if investors calculate a probability p that the manager is skilled, then her
second-period wage is ω(p), as calculated in Lemma 3.1.
The fraction µ plays a dual role in the model. First, because the family potentially benefits
from a manager only when she manages money, it prefers the investors’ opinion of a manager
to be high enough that they choose to invest their money with her. Second, conditional on the
manager working (i.e., controlling for the public belief about the manager), the family prefers
the manager’s actual skill to be high, as this increases the likelihood of high returns and their
associated positive revenue. We do not model the negotiation over µ; we only assume that if
monitoring creates expected value, then the negotiated µ splits this expected value between the
family and the manager. The split is likely to depend on the relative scarcity of monitoring and
managing, i.e., the relative bargaining power of the parties.15 Finally, note that µ cannot depend
on the manager’s skill, which is unknown at the time negotiation takes place.
We assume that there is no value added by replacing a fired manager with a new one. Since
the family would presumably earn revenue from such a replacement, the implicit assumption is
that the replacement cost equals this subsequent revenue. This equality is for convenience and not
important to the analysis; it is sufficient that the replacement cost be a significant deterrent to
firing the initial manager. Assuming that the family gets all of its revenues in the second period
only is also harmless. Indeed, income from the first period does not affect incentives and first-period
wages are the same regardless of the family’s actions.
4.2 The Agency Problem
The best monitoring can do is eliminate all contracting inefficiency by retaining a manager if and
only if she is skilled. With such monitoring in place, second-period investors would on average
pay the first-best amount φ(Axα − k) for the manager’s services. In particular, this monitoring
eliminates all inefficiency losses represented by the negative terms in (9) and (10). So first-best
monitoring adds a positive amount of expected value which the family and manager can share
14It would be easy to extend the analysis to include a specific monitoring cost and a non-zero reservation wage for
the family. So long as the sum of these two is not too large, monitoring by the family can still add value.
15If monitoring is costly to the family because of foregone revenue or monitoring-related expenditures, then µ must
recoup these costs in expectation for monitoring to be economical for the family. At the same time, (1 − µ) must be
large enough to allow the manager to do better than she can do without monitoring.
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through the µ they negotiate.
If a family’s incentives were to retain only skilled managers then the analysis of delegated
monitoring would end here. However, because firing the manager brings zero net revenue, the
family has no natural incentives to fire. For example, a family of one fund would never fire a
manager with a good first-period performance even if it discovers that this manager is unskilled.
The family gets zero from firing her, but gets whatever investors are willing to pay for a good-
performing manager from retaining her. Thus a manager gets no efficiency gains from being a
family’s only manager as the family’s incentives are then the same as the manager’s.
One way to drive a wedge between the incentives of the managers and those of the families is
to allow a family to monitor multiple managers. The rest of this section shows how this can work,
first in the simplest two-manager case, and then in the general N -manager case.
4.3 The Two-Fund Family
Instead of one manager in the family, now there are two managers, each with A dollars. The two
managers have independently distributed skills and returns, and we allow them and the family
to contract at the outset on a firing policy. The firing policies we allow are commitments by the
family to fire a stated number of good performers, and a stated number of bad performers (both
numbers could be zero), conditional on the performance realization. With two managers there are
three possible performance realizations: both good, both bad, and one good and one bad. The
firing policy, therefore, decides whether 0, 1 or 2 managers are fired if both have good first-period
performance, how many are fired if both have bad performance, and whether the good performer,
the bad performer or both are fired in the latter scenario. Commitment is assumed to be costless:
it is costless for the family to contract on the firing policy, and the family honors the contract at no
additional cost. As mentioned above, if instead this were costly, then the expected value created
by monitoring would have to be at least this cost.
We do not allow all possible firing policies. In particular we do not allow policies where the family
decides after the first period how many good performers or bad performers to fire. Such policies
push the model into a complex signaling environment where the public must calculate what each
possible combination of publicly-observable performance outcome and publicly-observable firing
outcome implies about the privately-observable skill outcome. The number of calculations grows
exponentially with the number of managers, quickly becoming unmanageable. With our restriction
on firing policies, the public sees exactly the firing outcome it expects given the performance
outcome, so the signaling complication is removed.
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Firing policies add value to the extent they contain information about the family’s private
observation of skill. Conditional on the first-period performance realizations, the public knows
exactly how many good and how many bad performers must be fired by the family. Because
the family receives a fixed fraction of the manager compensation in the second period and that
compensation is contingent on a good return, the family always prefers to fire an unskilled manager
rather than a skilled manager, given that a manager must be fired. So while the public does not
know exactly how many fired managers are skilled, they do know that, everything else equal, the
family prefers to retain a skilled manager over an unskilled manager. So a family’s firing policy can
add value when the family has a choice whom to fire because the public learns about a surviving
manager’s skill from the fact that she was not fired.
Solving this two-manager problem is simplified by several observations. First, the family cannot
add value by committing to firing both managers in a given outcome: without replacement, the
family would never get rid of its only two sources of revenue; it can only do better by firing either
zero or one manager. Second, the family does not commit to firing the poor performer (or to firing
the good performer) when one performance is good and the other bad, because doing so does not
tell the public anything more than it already knows from first-period returns. So the firing policy
pays off only if both performances are identical (both good or both bad), and the decisions to make
at the outset are whether to fire zero or one in each of these two circumstances.
If two managers generate the same return r ∈ {−x,+x} in the first period, then for each
manager, the public calculates the same probability φr that she is skilled. If the family must fire
one, it is in its best interests to retain a skilled manager if possible. The fact that investors know
this too is what potentially creates value from firing. This can be seen from Table 2, in which it is
assumed that the family must fire one of its managers at the beginning of the second period. At that
point, the family has learned the managers’ skills. Three combinations are possible: both skilled,
both unskilled, or one of each. Second-period investors do not know what the family observes, but
they can assign probabilities to each potential combination using the information from first-period
returns. The family has no choice but to fire a skilled (an unskilled) manager when they both
turn out to be skilled (unskilled). The monitoring gain comes from the other skill combination:
the family is better off retaining the skilled manager even if the two managers look identical to
investors. Knowing this, investors can update the probability that the retained manager is skilled:
it is simply the sum of the first two probabilities in the table, namely
φ2r + 2φr(1 − φr) = φr(2 − φr).
Clearly, this probability is greater than φr, the investors’ beliefs before they learn about the firing
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Managers’ skills Probability Fire Retain
(skilled, skilled) φ2r skilled skilled
(skilled, unskilled) 2φr
(
1 − φr
)
unskilled skilled
(unskilled, unskilled)
(
1 − φr
)2 unskilled unskilled
Table 2
Firing strategy of the fund family
After both managers generate returns of r ∈ {−x,+x} in the first period, the fund family learns whether or
not they are skilled. The second-period investors can calculate the probability of each potential combination
using the information from first-period returns. If the family must fire one manager, then it prefers to retain
a skilled manager if possible.
of the other manager. Whether this boost in investor beliefs is worth the firing of one potential
source of revenue depends on the relative values of φr and kAxα , as the next proposition summarizes.
Proposition 4.1 If both managers have the same first-period return r ∈ {−x,+x}, then the
second-period outcomes with and without delegated monitoring depend on φr and kAxα as follows.
(a) φr(2 − φr) < kAxα : Neither manager works the second period, with or without delegated mon-
itoring. The value created is zero.
(b) φr < kAxα ≤ φr(2−φr): Neither works the second period without delegated monitoring, but in
a fund family one is fired and the other works. The value created is 12
[
Axαφr(2 − φr) − k
]
per manager.
(c) φ2r <
k
Axα ≤ φr: Both work without delegated monitoring, but with a delegated monitor one is
fired and the other works. The value created is 12
(
k − Axαφ2r
)
per manager.
(d) kAxα ≤ φ2r: Both work with or without a delegated monitor. The value created is zero.
If the managers are not monitored and therefore hired or not hired simply on the strength of
their returns, there are just two regions in which kAxα can fall relative to φr. As shown in Lemma 3.1,
either kAxα > φr so they are both dismissed by investors, or
k
Axα ≤ φr so they are both retained.
Proposition 4.1 shows that monitoring inserts a region between the both-hired and both-dismissed
regions in which monitoring adds value and only one manager is retained.
The family’s monitoring proves to be valuable when kAxα and φr are relatively close (cases (b)
and (c)), that is, when investors are most uncertain about the value of money management. When
φr <
k
Axα ≤ φr(2 − φr) in case (b), public beliefs about each manager are not large enough for
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Figure 2
Gains from monitoring two managers
When two managers generate the same return r ∈ {−x,+x} in the first period, firing one of these two
managers creates some value as long as φ2r <
k
Axα ≤ φr(2 − φr).
investors to have their money managed in the second period. However, the boost from firing one
manager is large enough for contracting with the other manager to occur. When φ2r <
k
Axα ≤ φr
in case (c), it is again the case that one manager is fired and the other works, but the reason is
different. In this region, both managers would be rehired were they not monitored. Monitoring
creates value because it reduces the expected loss from hiring unskilled managers more than it
increases the expected loss from firing skilled managers. In other words, it is worthwhile for the
family to get rid of one source of revenue because it makes the other source more than twice as
valuable. Still, the family’s monitoring cannot add any value when kAxα is either very large or
very small (cases (a) and (d) respectively). In the first case, the fund fees per unit of return are
such that the fund is prohibitively expensive for investors to consider, even with the increase in
investor beliefs that firing a manager creates. In the latter case, the fees are so small that investors
are willing to pay a lot to have their money professionally managed, and so sacrificing a source of
revenue is too costly to get the boost in investor beliefs.
All these results are illustrated in Figure 2. In particular, the figure shows how value creation
centers around kAxα = φr, and gets (linearly) smaller as
k
Axα gets away from φr. A useful perspective
on the result is that monitoring adds value if kAxα is in the range
[
φ2r , φr(2 − φr)
]
. The width of
this range is 2φr(1−φr), which is proportional to the variance of the manager’s skill conditional on
her return. So the measure of the parameter space where monitoring adds expected value is linear
in the uncertainty about managerial skill that is not resolved for investors by performance.
Before we end this section, it is worth noting that all four scenarios of Proposition 4.1 are
possible for bad performers; that is with r = −x, the ratio kAxα may lie in any of the four ranges
of Figure 2. However, because of the restriction that we impose in (3) on the parameters of the
model, it is always the case that φ+x exceeds kAxα . This implies that, after both managers perform
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well in the first period, the only relevant question is whether φ2+x is smaller or larger than
k
Axα . So,
with good performance, monitoring can only add value through the firing of a manager who could
otherwise work.
4.4 The N -Fund Family
We now generalize the fund family to N managers. In this general case, there are N + 1 possible
first-period outcomes, one for each possible number M+x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} of good performers (the
number of bad performers is M−x = N − M+x). The firing policy dictates, for each of these
outcomes, how many good performers to fire and how many poor performers to fire. As before,
it is common knowledge that the family prefers retaining skilled managers to unskilled managers
when that is possible. We characterize the optimal firing policy for a given Mr, r ∈ {−x,+x}, and
show that the efficiency outcome approaches first-best as N grows.
When choosing its firing policy, the fund family seeks to recover as much of the contracting
inefficiency of section 3 as possible. The following proposition characterizes the optimal number
Fr(Mr) of Mr managers with the same first-period return r who will be fired. The proposition uses
B(I, J, p) to denote the binomial cumulative distribution function (cdf) for J draws, I successes
and probability p of success.16
Proposition 4.2 If there is an integer F , 0 < F < Mr, that satisfies
B(F − 1,Mr, 1 − φr) < k
Axα
< B(F,Mr, 1 − φr), (11)
then it is optimal for the family to commit to fire Fr(Mr) = F of the Mr managers who make
return r ∈ {−x,+x} in the first period. If B(0,Mr, 1− φr) > kAxα , then the optimal number to fire
is zero; if B(Mr − 1,Mr, 1 − φr) < kAxα , then no managers work the second period regardless of
monitoring.
The tradeoff used to derive this result is intuitive: as the family commits to fire a larger number
of managers, the publicly-perceived skill of a remaining manager is higher (implying a larger per-
manager surplus), but there are fewer managers working. The optimal choice of F , the number to
fire, minimizes the total expected value loss relative to the first-best. Expected value loss occurs
because skilled managers are fired and unskilled managers are retained. With each additional
manager fired, the expected value loss per manager from retaining the manager when unskilled
goes down while the expected value loss per manager from firing the manager when skilled goes up.
16That is, B(I, J, p) ≡ ∑Ii=0
(
J
i
)
pi(1 − p)J−i.
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When F is less than the optimum, the former outweighs the latter for an additional firing, while the
converse is true for all F at least as large as the optimum. So the optimal F is the smallest number
of firings for which an additional firing causes the following: the expected value loss per manager
from retaining an unskilled manager goes down by less than the amount by which the expected
value loss per manager from firing a skilled manager goes up. The last part of Proposition 4.2
simply points out that, just as in the two-manager case, there are parameters for which firing no
one is optimal and for which firing everyone is optimal, and these are cases for which monitoring
does not add any value. As the following result demonstrates, these parameter ranges shrink as
Mr increases.
Lemma 4.1 For any φr > 0 the optimal number F of managers to fire satisfies (11) for Mr large
enough.
Organizing funds under the umbrella of a fund family adds value when monitoring affects the
rehiring decisions of investors. Lemma 4.1 shows that this is the case for a fund family with a large
enough cross-section of similar fund managers. Indeed, when many managers perform similarly,
the family always finds it optimal to fire some managers and retain the others, thereby avoiding the
no-monitoring outcome. In the previous section, we showed that monitoring by a two-fund family
adds value if kAxα lands in a range 2φr(1 − φr) wide. Lemma 4.1 shows that M -fund families add
value if kAxα is between B(0,Mr, 1 − φr) and B(Mr − 1,Mr, 1 − φr), that is, if it is between φMrr
and 1 − (1 − φr)Mr , which expands to the entire unit interval as Mr grows.
The important quantity in all the above results is the ratio kAxα which, when rewritten as
k/A
xα ,
is seen to be the ratio of the per-dollar administrative expense to the per-dollar value added by
skill. So as the cost of running a fund increases relative to the value added by skill, whether from
k increasing or A or x decreasing, managers prefer policies with more ex-post firing. The effect of
α by itself depends on whether performance is good or bad. If α is higher then there is less firing
after good performance for two reasons: the loss from firing a skilled manager is higher, and the
likelihood that the performance came from a skilled manager is higher. The effect on firing after
bad performance is ambiguous because, while the loss from firing a skilled manager is higher, the
likelihood that the performance came from a skilled manager is now lower.
The firing policy described in Proposition 4.2 minimizes contracting inefficiencies for every
possible first-period outcome. Inefficiencies remain because the actual number of unskilled managers
differs from the expected number. However, as the number N of funds in the family grows, the
actual fraction of managers who are unskilled converges to the expected fraction, both for the
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good performance managers and for the bad performance managers. Thus we expect contracting
inefficiencies to be reduced as the size of the fund family increases. In fact, as we show next, the
remaining inefficiency goes to zero as the number of managers in the fund family grows. In the
limit, the first-best outcome is achieved through family monitoring. We start with the following
observation.
Lemma 4.2 As Mr grows,
Fr(Mr)
Mr
converges to 1 − φr.
As the number of managers with a given return increases, the fraction of managers fired con-
verges to the fraction of these managers expected ex ante to be unskilled. This observation leads
to our final result.
Proposition 4.3 As the number of funds in the family grows, contracting efficiency converges to
first-best.
In the limit, the entire efficiency loss is recaptured through family monitoring. More precisely,
in the limit, only the skilled managers are retained by the family for the second period and, because
investors understand this, they are willing to pay each retained manager the first-best expected
surplus generated by a single manager, Axα−k. We reach this conclusion even though we consider
only those firing policies that commit to the relation between two future observable and verifiable
events: the number of managers with a given performance, and the number of those fired. If the
contracting parties can do better by giving the family more ex post flexibility, then the convergence
to first-best is faster but the limit is the same. Of course, even though this limit outcome is identical
to the first-best outcome in terms of efficiency, it is the case that the first-best surplus of the second
period is now shared by the managers and the family (through µ). Finally, it is interesting to note
that the proofs to all the results in this section do not rely on the return distribution having two
points; the same results would apply in any finite outcome space.
5 Implications of the Model
Our theoretical model provides an economic rationale for mutual-fund families. In fact, its central
prediction is that these families will exist. The theory also yields some more precise and rejectable
predictions that can be taken to the data. These predictions help us explore the results of the
model more deeply and, at the same time, distinguish it from other theories.
The theory predicts that retention and firing grow more efficient as the family grows larger.
This should be apparent in a number of ways. The growing efficiency of retention means that the
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expected skill of a retained manager grows with the number of managers in the family. Therefore,
her future performance should be better. Fund flows are not dynamic in our model but if funds’
net returns equilibrate through new investment, as in Berk and Green (2002), then for a given
return history, the retained manager should attract more new investment if her family is larger. In
the limit, all information is in being retained, rather than in performing well. At the same time,
the prospects for fired managers should grow increasingly bleak. Thus the following implications
emerge.
Implication 5.1 The expected skill of a retained manager grows with the number of managers in
the family.
Implication 5.2 The expected performance before fees of a retained manager grows with the num-
ber of managers in the family.
Implication 5.3 Flows respond relatively less to fund performance and more to retention decisions,
as the associated fund family grows.
Implication 5.4 Managers fired from larger families should find new work less often and less easily
than managers fired from smaller families.
In the model, fund families add more value when public information is less informative. Dele-
gated monitoring addresses the insufficiency of public information about skill. So as this information
gap grows, the benefit from managing in a fund family, particularly a large one, grows. Therefore,
managers operating in asset classes or investment styles where public information is less informative
should be more likely to manage in families, and more likely to manage in relatively larger families.
The main sources of public information are portfolio returns and periodic portfolio disclosures,
so the less private information they convey, the more delegated monitoring should be applied.
The information conveyed by returns and portfolios is difficult to quantify, and the information
not conveyed is even more so, but some intuition is possible. If a fund trades more liquid assets
then its periodic portfolio disclosures are less informative, both because the portfolio changes more
quickly, and also because (as in Musto, 1999) the manager can more easily trade into a more
flattering portfolio. Therefore, monitoring adds more value as liquidity goes up. Similarly, when a
fund is prohibited from taking short positions in risky securities, disclosed portfolios convey little
information about the manager’s beliefs about assets she did not buy; monitoring should add more
value in that case as well. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and Welch (2002) show that managers
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sometimes game their sample Sharpe ratios with short-odds bets. This also makes their returns
less informative, and so our theory would predict that the value of monitoring (and larger fund
families) goes up as the feasibility of (or benefit from) this gaming goes up. Finally, if management
is done in teams, then attribution of performance to people is less precise, and monitoring value is
higher. This discussion can be summarized by the following implications.
Implication 5.5 Fund families will be more prevalent as asset liquidity goes up.
Implication 5.6 Fund families will be more prevalent when managers are prohibited from taking
short positions in risky assets.
Implication 5.7 Fund families will be more prevalent when managers can more easily game fund
Sharpe ratios.
Implication 5.8 Fund families will be more prevalent when fund management is performed in
teams.
A manager benefits more from monitoring if less is known about her skill. Monitoring adds
more value early in a manager’s career since more is known about her skill if she has a longer track
record. In fact, in the context of our model, an infinitely long track record fully reveals a manager’s
ability. We should therefore expect managers to work in fund families earlier, rather than later, in
their careers.
Implication 5.9 Managers are more likely to work in fund families early in their careers.
Families use information about manager quality over and above that in the fund’s return his-
tory. Consequently, the firing behavior of families is expected to differ from that of investors with
respect to stand-alone funds. Proposition 4.2 provides even more specific predictions about these
differences.
Implication 5.10 Families sometimes fire managers after a return history that would not cause
a stand-alone fund to fold. Conversely, families sometimes retain managers after a return history
that would cause a stand-alone fund to fold.
Admittedly, there is very little evidence, if any, showing that contracts between families and
their funds explicitly require families to close a return-dependent fraction of their funds, as in our
model. Even so, this lack of evidence does not necessarily mean that families are not performing
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the type of monitoring function we describe. Even if commitments to fire are not made explicitly,
it is possible that reputational considerations motivate families to fire a return-dependent fraction
of managers. In a multi-period setting, investors may avoid investing with families who have failed
in their operating histories to fire the requisite return-dependent fractions of their managers.
Implication 5.11 Surviving families fire more than non-surviving families.
6 Conclusion
Decades of empirical studies have established that it is very hard to estimate portfolio-manager
skill from realized portfolio returns. The portfolio manager herself has more than her portfolio’s
returns to learn from: she knows why she chose the initial portfolio, how and why she traded it,
how the realizations of individual securities’ returns compare with what she expected, and so on.
She learns more from a period of experience than outsiders learn from a period of portfolio returns,
so it stands to reason that she enters the next period knowing more about her skill than outsiders
know. A manager with a good return could privately know she is not worth hiring, and a manager
with a poor return could privately know she is worth hiring. The problem is how to transmit this
information credibly to investors when the low ability manager has no incentive to reveal her low
ability to investors. We show how monitoring by a fund family can credibly reveal information
about manager quality to investors and we demonstrate how multiple-fund monitoring by a single
family is crucial to its effectiveness. In particular, a one-manager fund family has little credibility
since the family’s incentives are exactly those of the manager. We show how increasing the number
of funds monitored by the family can avoid this incentive problem. We make this point in the
context of money management but the principle applies more generally. The key elements of the
economic situation are that the agent learns about skill over time, that someone else could also
learn at sufficiently low cost, and that a number of other agents are in a similar situation. This
could describe the situation of, for example, assistant professors.
We analyze the situation where a manager’s performance is publicly observable from the moment
she starts managing. In practice there is some discretion because the family could have the manager
handle house money, or pretend money, for a while. The manager would intuitively have to cross a
threshold of promise, as calculated from this practice experience, to start handling public money.
Outsiders could infer this threshold and therefore know, as the model assumes, the manager’s
promise at that point. So the model still applies in the bigger picture where managers practice
first, but it would be interesting to see what the optimal threshold is in this framework.
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We do not claim to have identified the only reason why fund managers may want to gather
under the umbrella of a fund family. There are undoubtedly reasons other than the value that more
credible monitoring creates (e.g., marketing reasons and economies of scale and scope). However,
our framework could also be useful to study other aspects of the money-management industry. For
instance, it may be interesting to consider when a fund manager would be better off leaving a fund
family to manage independently (e.g., start a hedge fund). Our analysis suggests that managers
who believe their skill has been established beyond a doubt would see little benefit from monitoring,
as would managers who perceive little difference between what they will privately learn about their
skill and what their returns will convey.
Finally, the result that monitoring captures more value as the number of funds grows may relate
to the recent development of “funds of funds.”17 Many funds have recently launched with the sole
intention of investing in existing hedge funds. Given the close relation that investors can enjoy with
the hedge funds they patronize, this trend may reflect a demand from hedge-fund managers for
credible monitoring. How managers sort into those who manage independently, those who manage
partly for funds of funds and those who manage within mutual-fund families is a promising area
for future research.
17We are grateful to Zhiwu Chen for pointing out this possibility to us.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Let us denote the investors’ information set at the beginning of the second period by I. Since
investors assign a probability p that the manager is skilled, they expect her to generate an average
net surplus of
A
(
E
[
r˜ | I, a˜ = α]Pr{a˜ = α | I}+ E[r˜ | I, a˜ = α]Pr{a˜ = 0 | I})− k
= A
[
xαp + 0(1 − p)]− k = Axαp − k
with their money if they hire her. The manager will be hired by the investors if and only if this last
quantity is positive; this is equivalent to (5). In that case, since the investors assign a probability
of
Pr
{
r˜ = +x | I, a˜ = α}Pr{a˜ = α | I}+ Pr{r˜ = +x | I, a˜ = 0}Pr{a˜ = 0 | I}
=
1 + α
2
φ +
1
2
(1 − φ) = 1 + αp
2
to the manager generating positive returns in the period, the manager extracts all of the surplus
by announcing a compensation contract of
ω = ω(p) ≡ 2(Axαp − k)
1 + αp
.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
This result follows from a simple application of Bayes’ rule:
φ+x ≡ Pr
{
a˜ = α
∣∣ r˜1 = +x}
=
Pr
{
r˜1 = +x
∣∣ a˜ = α}Pr{a˜ = α}∑
a=0,α
Pr
{
r˜1 = +x
∣∣ a˜ = a}Pr{a˜ = a}
=
1+α
2 φ
1+α
2 φ +
1
2(1 − φ)
=
(1 + α)φ
1 + αφ
.
Similarly,
φ−x ≡ Pr
{
a˜ = α
∣∣ r˜1 = −x}
=
Pr
{
r˜1 = −x
∣∣ a˜ = α}Pr{a˜ = α}∑
a=0,α
Pr
{
r˜1 = −x
∣∣ a˜ = a}Pr{a˜ = a}
=
1−α
2 φ
1−α
2 φ +
1
2(1 − φ)
=
(1 − α)φ
1 − αφ .
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Proof of Proposition 3.1
If φ−x < kAxα , then the manager works only after a good first-period return so π0 is the prob-
ability of a good first-period return times the expected surplus conditional on a good first-period
return, i.e., 1+αφ2
[
Axα
(
(1+α)φ
1+αφ
)
− k
]
, which rearranges to (9).
If φ−x ≥ kAxα , then the manager works the second period no matter what, so π0 is the same as
the first-period expected surplus Axαφ − k, which rearranges to (10).
Proof of Proposition 4.1
If φr(2− φr) < kAxα , then Lemma 3.1 tells us that the probability that the retained manager is
skilled, conditional on her return and the fact that she was retained, is too low for her to work the
second period, so neither manager works the second period.
If φr < kAxα , we know from Lemma 3.1 that the managers cannot work the second period
without monitoring, but if φr(2 − φr) ≥ kAxα , then the retained manager’s probability of being
skilled is high enough to work. The total surplus for the retained manager is Axαφr(2 − φr) − k,
which is shared equally by the two managers at the outset.
If φr ≥ kAxα then, from Lemma 3.1 once again, both managers would work the second period
after making r in the first if there were no firing policy, and would get the expected surplus
Axαφr−k. If the fund family commits to firing one of them then the expected surplus of the retained
manager is Axαφr(2 − φr) − k, and each manager’s expected surplus at the outset, conditional on
both managers making r in the first period, is 12
[
Axαφr(2−φr)− k
]
. So the expected value added
per manager by the firing policy is 12
[
Axαφr(2 − φr) − k
]− (Axαφr − k) = 12(k − Axαφ2r). So this
is the value added by the firing policy, and it is positive if and only if φ2r <
k
Axα .
Finally, if φ2r ≥ kAxα , then the expected value created by firing one of the two managers,
calculated in the previous paragraph, is negative. So neither is fired and both work (since φr is
then greater than kAxα).
Proof of Proposition 4.2
We prove the result for a given first-period return r ∈ {−x,+x}, and a given number M of
managers who generate that return. Let U represent the number of the M managers who are
unskilled. Suppose that the family commits to firing F of M managers who make return r, and
let T1(F ) and T2(F ) be the probabilities that a manager calculates at the outset that she will be
fired when skilled and retained when unskilled, respectively. The family maximizes expected value
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by minimizing total contracting inefficiency, i.e., by choosing F to minimize
T1(F )(Axα − k) + T2(F )k.
When the family’s policy is to fire F managers, some skilled managers end up getting fired
when fewer than F of the M managers are unskilled; that is, F −U skilled managers get fired when
U < F . Thus the expected number of skilled managers who get fired is
F−1∑
U=0
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur (F − U),
and so a manager’s ex ante probability of being fired while skilled is
T1(F ) =
1
M
F−1∑
U=0
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur (F − U).
This means that the commitment to fire an additional manager increases the ex ante probability
of being fired while skilled by
T1(F + 1) − T1(F ) = 1
M
F∑
U=0
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur =
1
M
B
(
F,M, 1 − φr
)
.
Similarly, when the family’s policy is to fire F managers, unskilled managers are retained when
more than F managers are unskilled; that is U − F unskilled managers are retained when U > F .
The expected number of unskilled managers who are retained is
M∑
U=F+1
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur (U − F ),
and so a manager’s ex ante probability of being retained while unskilled is
T2(F ) =
1
M
M∑
U=F+1
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur (U − F ).
Firing an additional manager increases the ex ante probability of being retained while unskilled
by18
T2(F + 1) − T2(F ) = − 1
M
M∑
U=F+1
(
M
U
)
(1 − φr)UφM−Ur = −
1
M
[
1 − B(F,M, 1 − φr)].
18Of course, this quantity is negative, reflecting the fact that firing an additional manager actually decreases the
likelihood that an unskilled manager is retained.
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So if the family moves from a policy of firing F to a policy of firing F + 1, total efficiency loss
increases by
[
T1(F + 1) − T1(F )
]
(Axα − k) + [T2(F + 1) − T2(F )] k = 1
M
[
B
(
F,M, 1 − φr
)
Axα − k
]
.
This quantity is increasing in F and has the same sign as B(F,M, 1 − φr) − kAxα . So if there is an
interior solution for F , it is the first F for which B(F,M, 1−φr) > kAxα , that is the F that satisfies
B
(
F − 1,M, 1 − φr
)
<
k
Axα
< B
(
F,M, 1 − φr
)
. (12)
For each of the M − F retained managers, outside investors will calculate a probability of being
skilled greater than kAxα , since the probability that all retained managers are skilled is B(F,M, 1−
φr) which, from (12), is greater than kAxα . So F managers are fired and M − F work the second
period. If B(0,M, 1 − φr) > kAxα then firing zero is optimal. If B(M − 1,M, 1 − φr) < kAxα , then
the probability that at least one manager is skilled is below kAxα so no manager can work no matter
how many are fired.
Proof of Lemma 4.1
The value of B(0,M, 1−φr) is φMr , which asymptotes to 0 as M grows so, for M large enough,
it is below kAxα . Similarly, the value of B(M − 1,M, 1 − φr) is 1 − (1 − φr)M , which asymptotes
to 1 as M grows so, for M large enough, it is above kAxα .
Proof of Lemma 4.2
Let the random variable U˜ represent the number of unskilled managers when M managers
generate the same first-period return r ∈ {−x,+x}. This random variable follows a binomial
distribution Bin
(
M, 1 − φr
)
. Let 1 = 12
k
Axα . From the weak law of large numbers we know that
for any δ ∈ (0, 1) there is an m1 such that M > m1 implies
Pr
{
U˜
M
≤ (1 − φr) − δ
}
< 1 <
k
Axα
. (13)
From Lemma 4.1, we know that for M large enough (M > m′1, say),
k
Axα
< B
(
F,M, 1 − φr
)
= Pr
{
U˜
M
≤ F
M
}
. (14)
Together, (13) and (14) imply that
F
M
> (1 − φr) − δ (15)
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for M > max(m1,m′1).
Similarly, if we let 2 = 12
(
1 − kAxα
)
, we know that for the same δ as above there is an m2 such
that M > m2 implies
Pr
{
U˜
M
≥ (1 − φr) + δ
}
< 2 < 1 − k
Axα
. (16)
From Lemma 4.1, we also have Pr
{
U˜ ≤ F − 1} = B(F − 1,M, 1 − φr) < kAxα for M large enough
(M > m′2, say), which is equivalent to
Pr
{
U˜
M
≥ F
M
}
> 1 − k
Axα
. (17)
Together, (16) and (17) imply that
F
M
< (1 − φr) + δ (18)
for M > max(m2,m′2). So, for M > max(m1,m′1,m2,m′2), (15) and (18) imply that (1− φr)− δ <
F
M < (1 − φr) + δ. Since we can make δ arbitrarily small, this means that FM converges to 1 − φr,
as desired.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
There are two elements to the proof: (i) contracting efficiency for M managers who all make
return r ∈ {−x,+x} converges to first-best as M goes to infinity; (ii) the effect of the number N of
managers on the distribution of M , combined with (i), implies convergence as N goes to infinity.
(i) Contracting efficiency for M managers who make r converges to first-best as M goes to
infinity if the expected fraction of unskilled managers who are retained and the expected fraction of
skilled managers who are fired converge to zero as M goes to infinity. As in the proof of Lemma 4.2,
we let the random variable U˜ represent the number of unskilled managers when M managers
generate the same first-period return r ∈ {−x,+x}.
Expected fraction of retained unskilled managers goes to zero. Let us denote the fraction of
retained unskilled managers by f˜U ≡ max(0,U˜−F )M . For any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have
E
[
f˜U
]
= Pr
{
f˜U ≤ δ
}
E
[
f˜U | f˜U ≤ δ
]
+ Pr
{
f˜U > δ
}
E
[
f˜U | f˜U > δ
]
≤ 1 · δ + Pr{f˜U > δ} · 1 = δ + Pr{f˜U > δ}
= δ + Pr
{
U˜ − F
M
> δ
}
= δ + Pr
{
U˜
M
>
F
M
+ δ
}
. (19)
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From Lemma 4.2 (and its proof), we know we can choose an m such that M > m implies both that
(1−φr)− δ2 < FM < (1−φr)+ δ2 and also that Pr
{
U˜
M > (1−φr)+ δ2
}
< δ. These inequalities imply
δ > Pr
{
U˜
M
> (1 − φr) + δ2
}
= Pr
{
U˜
M
>
[
(1 − φr) − δ2
]
+ δ
}
≥ Pr
{
U˜
M
>
F
M
+ δ
}
,
so that E
[
f˜U
]
in (19) is smaller than 2δ. Since we can make δ arbitrarily small, this implies that
the expected fraction of retained unskilled managers goes to zero.
Expected fraction of fired skilled managers goes to zero. Let us denote the fraction of fired skilled
managers by f˜S ≡ max(0,F−U˜)M . For any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have
E
[
f˜S
]
= Pr
{
f˜S ≤ δ
}
E
[
f˜S | f˜S ≤ δ
]
+ Pr
{
f˜S > δ
}
E
[
f˜S | f˜S > δ
]
≤ 1 · δ + Pr{f˜S > δ} · 1 = δ + Pr{f˜S > δ}
= δ + Pr
{
F − U˜
M
> δ
}
= δ + Pr
{
U˜
M
<
F
M
− δ
}
. (20)
Again, from Lemma 4.2, we know we can choose an m such that M > m implies both that
(1−φr)− δ2 < FM < (1−φr)+ δ2 and also that Pr
{
U˜
M < (1−φr)− δ2
}
< δ. These inequalities imply
δ > Pr
{
U˜
M
< (1 − φr) − δ2
}
= Pr
{
U˜
M
<
[
(1 − φr) + δ2
]
− δ
}
≥ Pr
{
U˜
M
<
F
M
− δ
}
,
so that E
[
f˜S
]
in (20) is smaller than 2δ. Since we can make δ arbitrarily small, this implies that
the expected fraction of fired skilled managers goes to zero. This completes the first part of the
proof.
(ii) To finish the proof, observe that the number M˜ of managers who generate a first-period
return of r follows a binomial distribution with N draws and probability of success p equal to either
1−φα
2 for r = −x or to 1+φα2 for r = +x. Thus from the weak law of large numbers we know that
M˜
N converges in probability to p. From the first part of the proof, we know that for any δ ∈ (0, 1)
there is an m such that M˜ > m implies that the expected fraction of the M˜ managers who are
skilled and fired or unskilled and retained is less than δ2 . The convergence of
M˜
N to p means that
there is an n such that N > n implies that Pr
{
M˜
N ≤ mN
}
< δ2 (since
m
N goes to zero and p stays the
same as N grows). So the expected fraction of managers who are skilled and fired or unskilled and
retained is less than δ2 +
δ
2 = δ. Therefore, since we can make δ arbitrarily small, efficiency losses
converge to zero as N goes to infinity. This completes the proof.
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Appendix B
Proof that w˜2 in (4) is signaling-proof in the second period
At the beginning of the second period, the manager knows whether or not she is skilled. The
investors don’t, and so update the probability that the manager is skilled to, say, φ′ ∈ (0, 1). Any
contract offered to the investors by a skilled manager can and has to be imitated by the unskilled
manager (i.e., the managers pool in equilibrium): otherwise, the manager is immediately identified
as unskilled, and she is not hired by the second-period investors.
In equilibrium, any contract offered to the second-period investors extracts all of the available
surplus, denoted S for this proof. So, if the contract offered by the manager pays ω+x ≥ 0 for positive
returns, and ω−x ≥ 0 for negative returns, it will be the case that, in this pooling equilibrium,
1 + αφ′
2
ω+x +
1 − αφ′
2
ω−x = S,
which implies that ω+x must satisfy
ω+x = ω−x +
2(S − ω−x)
1 + αφ′
. (21)
The expected compensation of a skilled manager is then
1 + α
2
ω+x +
1 − α
2
ω−x
which, using (21), is equal to
1 + α
1 + αφ′
S − α(1 − φ
′)
1 + αφ′
ω−x.
This last expression is clearly decreasing in ω−x, so the skilled manager will want to reduce it as
much as possible. Given limited liability, it will be the case that the skilled manager prefers a
contract with ω−x = 0 to any other contract allowing investors to break even. Thus the equilibrium
second-period contract is of the form specified in (4).
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